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6XPPDU\
Institutional support for encouraging renewable energy technologies in India, is strong at the
state, the national and international levels. Within Gujarat a range of underlying drivers and
more explicit policies and incentives have encouraged private investment in wind power. The
Gujarat Electricity Board is financially and operationally weak. Constrained by a range of
factors they are unable to meet increasing demand for power and future supply is likely to
come from private power producers, increasing the overall cost of power. Inadequate
investment within the transmission and distribution system further reduces the reliability and
quality of supply to consumers. Industrial consumers must subsidise agricultural consumption,
yet suffer an increasingly poor service as a result. Therefore an increasing number of
industries are investing in self-generation including wind power thereby further reducing the
GEBs revenue.
The performance of wind power projects installed within Gujarat has so far been
disappointing, and objectives for reducing the cost/kWh of wind power not realised. Initial
problems relating to manufacturing; operation and maintenance of wind turbines have been
reduced as experience has been gained. Yet a number of factors continue to constrain the
commercialisation of the wind power industry in India, this paper argues that primarily these
are institutional in character.2
.H\ZRUGV:LQGSRZHU3ULYDWHSRZHUSURGXFWLRQLQVWLWXWLRQDOFRQVWUDLQWV*XMDUDW,QGLD
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 “Institutional” is used in reference to the bureaucratic and political framework in which activities relating to the
India power sector are carried out. Here a number of institutional barriers to wind power development are
identified and primarily relate to the inexperience of agencies and inappropriate policies, for dealing with wind
power projects.
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 ,QWURGXFWLRQ
India is the world’s fourth largest investor in wind power and the largest wind power producer
in developing countries with 992 MW of installed wind power capacity in September 1998.
This paper concentrates on wind power development in Gujarat, which in 1986 was the first
Indian state to install a wind power project, and currently has the second highest installed
capacity of any state.3 Examining the history of wind power development in this state provides
useful lessons for policy-makers wishing to promote the successful development of the wind
power industry in India.
Since liberalisation of the generation sector in 1991, there has been a considerable degree of
institutional support at the state, the national and international levels for encouraging private
sector participation within the wind power industry in Gujarat. A number of incentives have
been provided, these have stimulated a significantly high level of investment within wind
turbines, but not led to a decrease in the cost/kWh of wind power. Rather the performance of
projects has been disappointing and although solutions to some of the earlier problems such as
inadequate level of skills, have been found, a number of factors continue to constrain the
commercialisation Gujarat. This paper argues that the institutional framework and support
mechanisms for wind power have themselves served to create barriers to the successful
development of wind power in Gujarat. Primarily these relate to: the institutional complexity
within which potential wind power developers must act; the structure and regulation of the
GEB (Gujarat Electricity Board); and the fiscal incentives for capital investment. 
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 As of March 1997 the installed capacity of wind power in Tamil Nadu was 675 MW (Central Board of
Irrigation and Power, 1997a).
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 ,QVWLWXWLRQVLQYROYHGLQSURPRWLQJUHQHZDEOH
HQHUJ\LQ,QGLD
A range of institutions involved in promoting renewable energy in India. These are found at
the state, the national and international levels.
 0LQLVWULHVDQGDJHQFLHVDWWKHQDWLRQDOOHYHO
The dissemination of technologies for improving the efficiency of utilisation of biomass
resources for cooking requirements has been a central part of Indian rural development since
the late 1940s. A rural energy crisis that resulted from inappropriate policies for development
and market failure during the 1970s led to greater emphasis on existing and potential use of
renewable resources for rural energy use. This became translated into policies at the national
level in 1981 through establishment of the Commission for Additional Sources of Energy
(CASE). As part of the Union government in 1982, the Department of Non-Conventional
Energy Sources (DNES) was formed. Aiming to stimulate rural development, policies were
introduced to promote the decentralised use of renewable resources through providing
subsidies directly to renewable energy users (Shukla, 1997).
In 1992 the DNES became the Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Resources (MNES),
making India the first country to establish a ministry specifically for creating policies,
strategies and implementation plans for promotion of renewable energy. Initially different
departments dealt with individual technologies, in 1994 the MNES was restructured into three
main divisions wind power being dealt with by the Power Division4. Activities undertaken
include resource potential assessment; research, development, demonstration and
commercialisation of renewable energy technologies; promotion of local manufacturing
capabilities; institutional capacity building and human resource development as well as;
design of financial incentives and project financing mechanisms. (MNES, Annual Report
1996-97).
A number of other national institutions are involved in promoting RETs, namely the Planning
Commission, the ministries of Agriculture and Rural development; Science and Technology;
Biotechnology and; Environment and Forests. Most of these government institutions are also
represented at the state level. Wind power projects are also subject to the Central Electricity
Authority (CEA) which is responsible for setting national policy and planning objectives for
the power sector and the Ministry of Power (MoP) which establishes the rules by which these
are carried out.
The Indian government expresses strong commitment for sustainable development. This is
reflected by the large number of institutions and policies for encouraging research into
environmental issues and diffusion of RETs. However this has not been translated into more
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 The Power division also deals with cogeneration; small hydro and grid connected solar PV. The Rural Energy
Groups I and II deal with energy from biomass technologies; technologies used for water pumping; solar thermal
and PV lighting applications. The Urban and Industrial Energy Division mainly deals with energy from waste and
conservation issues.
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stringent environmental regulation on coal combustion. This is limited to statutory
requirements on the minimum height of chimneystacks to reduce local deposition of ash
(Ministry of Environment & Forests, 1994).
The Rural Electrification Corporation (REC) was established in 1969. Initially limited to
financing energy projects for water pumping, it now distributes funds primarily provided by
the World Bank, for village electrification on an area-wide basis directly to the State
Electricity Boards (SEBs) whose financial viability is assessed according to World Bank
guidelines. However economic viability of projects are assessed according to the wider social
benefits and lower interest rates set accordingly. Although the MNES and the REC are
supposed to co-ordinate with each other, in practise they have relatively little interaction,
preventing a more integrated rural energy planning approach. Similarly the divisions within
the MNES for different RETs also hinders this (Monga, 1997).
 7KH,QGLDQUHQHZDEOHHQHUJ\GHYHORSPHQWDJHQF\
The Indian Renewable Energy Agency Limited (IREDA) is a public sector undertaking,
established in 1987 by the MNES. The main role of the agency is to promote, support and
extend financial assistance to renewable energy projects. Funds are operated through a
revolving fund to assist producers, manufacturers and users of renewable energy technologies.
IREDA channels multilateral and bilateral funds primarily provided by the World Bank, the
Asian Development Bank, DANIDA, the Netherlands Government and the Swiss
Development Co-operation. “Soft” loans (lower interest rate loans) are offered to stimulate
investment in renewable projects, technical guidance and project assistance also being made
available. By 31st March 1997, IREDA had sanctioned 918 renewable projects totalling loan
commitment of Rs1703 crore (IREDA, 1997a).
All types of borrowers are eligible for financial assistance except the SEBs5 and Government
Departments. Under World Bank guidelines, wind power developers may receive IREDA
funds at a 16% interest rate (0.5% higher than the rate which IREDA procures funds) for a
maximum period of 10 years. 100% of the equipment costs may be provided and up to 75% of
the project cost, the promoter providing the remaining 25%6 (IREDA, 1997b).
 ,QWHUQDWLRQDOGHYHORSPHQWDJHQFLHV
Following on from the MNES wind-mapping, monitoring and demonstration projects, the
World Bank through ESMAP (the Energy Sector Management Assistance Programme)
undertook a site-specific pre-investment study to assess the commercial viability of wind
projects. ESMAPS objectives were to identify: Sites most likely to be commercially viable;
                                                
5
 SEBs undergoing restructuring are eligible in certain cases.
6
 In accordance with World Bank financing guidelines the following are awarded for projects:
Over US $5,000,000 - tendered for internationally through international competitive bidding (ICB).
Between US $5,000,000 - US $50,000 - Request for Quotation (RQF).
Under US $50,000- Established Commercial Practises (ECP).
Less than or equal to US $ 200,000 - Local Competitive Bidding.
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project packages that would be “Bankable” and; measures for improving the local capabilities
for technology development. As the World Banks first major RETs venture, US$78 million
worth of credit was extended to IREDA. Included within this was US$13 million of
concessional financing provided by the Global Environment Facility, as grant funding based
on the environmental benefits that installed wind power would provide. The main objective of
the World Banks Wind Farm Programme is to set up 85MW of grid connected wind power,
and undertake activities for providing financial and technical assistance to prospective wind
power developers (Naidu, 1997).
The Danish International Development Agency; DANIDA was the first international agency
to show interest in the potential Indian wind power market, enabling the Danish manufacturer
Micon to be the first to install wind power in India. In 1986 through a joint venture with
NEPC7 a 1.1MW demonstration wind project was set-up in Gujarat. There has since been a
considerable level of interest by international manufacturers of wind turbines, keen to gain a
share of the large potential market for wind power in India. Over 24 Indian companies have
formed collaborations with companies from Austria, Denmark, Germany, the Netherlands,
Belgium, Sweden and the USA. The UNDP and DANIDA are currently co-funding two
centres in Guajrat and Tamil Nadu for turbine blade testing. (Interviews 19978).
                                                
7
 NEPC-Micon is now a major manufacturer of wind turbines, earlier activities of NEPC are within the clothes;
steel; food and airlines industries.
8
 Much of the information presented in this paper was garnered from interviews with over 80 people, conducted
between September and December 1997. Relevant people were from the following:
Gujarat – Policy-makers within the Gujarat Government, from the Ministry of Energy and Petroleum; Ministry of
Finance; Ministry of Non-Conventional Energy Sources; Ministry for Environment and Forests, the State
Pollution Control Board; GEB Management; the AEC; GEDA; WEPA; NEPC-Micon and other manufacturers;
GPCL; GIIC; industries investing in wind power and/or co-generation.
New Delhi -  Policy-makers within the national government, from the Ministry of Power; Ministry of Finance;
Ministry for Environment and Forests; the CEA; the Planning Commission; IREDA; the REC; the PFC (Power
Finance Corporation); NTPC; NHPC; Powergrid as well as academic and legal experts.
New Delhi - International actors including members of the; Asian Development Bank; DFID; USAID; UNDP;
and the World Bank.
&,&(52:RUNLQJ3DSHU
Institutional barriers to commercialisation of wind power in India: The case of Gujarat
10
 'HPDQGVDQGFRQVWUDLQWVRQWKH*XMDUDWSRZHU
VHFWRU
Institutional support for industrial and commercial activities in Gujarat is strong, successfully
encouraging relatively high levels of investment within these sectors. As such the Gujarat
economy has experienced relatively rapid growth in recent years.9 Industrial activities are
related to the abundance of natural resources: Crude oil and natural gas provide feedstock for
production of petro-chemicals, pharmaceuticals and dyestuff. The large agricultural sector
provides the resources for textiles and food manufacturers. Although the majority of industries
are clustered around the five major city areas in the South and eastern parts of the state, more
dispersed centres of growth are emerging along the coast. Gujarat is well situated for
exporting goods to Europe, Africa and the Middle East, as well as to western India, where the
largest local market exists.
Given the large industrial and agricultural sectors demand for power within Gujarat is large.
As of August 1997 the total installed capacity of the GEB was 4420MW of power, whereas
the peak demand is 6511MW. The total available capacity for Gujarat is 6554MW10, and
through load shedding,11 the GEB is able to “cater” for a peak demand of 5294MW (GEB,
1997b & GEB, 1997c). The ability of the GEB to reduce the demand-supply gap is
constrained by a range of factors.
 8QFHUWDLQW\RIIXHOVXSSO\
Indigenous coal production falls short of demand making fuel-supply a problem for most of
India, yet the GEB is required to buy their coal, mined in the East of India,12 from nationalised
coal companies. The cost of coal is increased by the Railway Freight Pricing Policy, which
charges high rates for deliveries of coal.13 Heavily overburdened, the railways impose
restrictions on the volumes of coal delivered, so the GEB cannot be certain of their delivery.
Furthermore alternative energy resources are also limited; there is little hydro power potential;
existing on and off-shore crude oil and natural gas supplies are considered national resources
and reserved for production of liquid petroleum gas, and industrial feedstock (TEDDY, 1997).
 5HJXODWLRQDQGWDULIIV
The GEB is subject to legislative policies from both the central and state governments as set
out in the Electricity Act of 1948 which states that policies set by national level ministries
                                                
9
 Gross State Domestic Product of Rs1, 15,550mn, is large relative to India’s GNP of Rs19, 32,220mn. The per
capita income is also large at Rs7,586 compared to Rs6,249 for all India (1992-93 levels).
10
 Power is purchased from central sector generators and the Ahmedebad Electricity Corporation, a licensee
company supplying power to the Gujarat cities of Ahmedebad and Gandhinagar.
11
 Agricultural consumers receive unmetered power for a limited 8 hour period on a 12 hour rotational basis.
12
 Coal deposits are unevenly dispersed throughout India, and are concentrated within the Eastern states of Bihar,
Madya Pradesh and Orissa.
13
 Constituting 40% of the total goods traffic, coal deliveries effectively subsidise other rail services.
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must be implemented and regulated by the GEB. In practise the Gujarat government dictates
most decisions and through the 1910 Act it can determine the price of power for consumers
considered essential to the community. As in many Indian states it is mandatory for industrial
and commercial consumers to cross-subsidise the power consumed by agricultural sector for
irrigation (Government of Gujarat, 1995).
Demand from the agricultural sector is increasing thereby increasing the revenue losses from
that sector. As the GEBs revenue worsens, and as sole distributor of power, so the already
chronic under-investment in the transmission and distribution system continues. The
reliability and quality of power supplied by the GEB is poor (blackouts; brownouts and
fluctuating frequencies are commonplace) and worsening. Under capacities in supply, as well
as in the T&D system are increasing the need for load shedding and organised power cuts.
Industrial consumers are forced to subsidise consumption by the agricultural sector, yet
receive a poor level of service as a result. Since the late 1970s industrial consumers have been
offered attractive incentives14 to generate power for their own use. On-site generation
provides industry with a more reliable supply of power and allows purchase of expensive
utility power to be avoided. Thus increasing numbers of industrial consumers are opting for
self-generation through which is further undermining the financial situation of the GEB.
Tariffs are supposed to yield a profit of at least 3% return on fixed assets, after any subsidies,
yet by 1995-96 the rate of return was as low as -15.7%. Such large losses prevents the GEB
from accessing funds from national financing corporations such as the REC. Provision of
cheap and unmetered power supply, is said to be used by political parties for winning the
agricultural “vote.” It is widely believed that any attempts to remove power subsidies would
provoke civil unrest, and a probable change of government Consequently although it is
accepted that tariff reform is vital for improving the performance of the Gujarat power sector,
it is widely regarded as being politically impossible. (Interviews, 1997).
 3ULYDWHSRZHUSURGXFWLRQ
Financially very weak the GEB15 is unable to access capital for investment in new generation
facilities and it is likely that in the future all new generation is likely to come from the private
sector.
In 1991 the Indian generation sector was opened to local and/or foreign private investors,
ownership being offered on 30-year licenses. “Every developer’s favourite state”16, there is
strong support for encouraging successful private participation in Gujarat, and a number of
independent power production facilities are under construction. Since 1994 further incentives
of reduced import duties and tax avoidance have been offered. In 1997 the Essar plant in
Gujarat was the first IPP in India to begin operation. However expansion of the private power
sector has been slower than expected, due to problems in negotiation of fuel-supply
                                                
14
 The captive power policy was introduced based on diesel fuelled generation.
15
 For the year 1995-96, SEB total losses were over $2 billion, double that for 1991-92, indicating that the
financial performance of these utilities is declining rapidly.
16State of SEBs, 1997, PowerLine, 1(12): 30.
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contracts17. Investors perceive the level of risk to be high given the political instability of the
region and that power must be purchased by the GEB which is financially and operationally
poor. Consequently very high rates of return are demanded making the cost of private power
high. Purchase of IPP generation therefore further undermines the GEBs financial situation.
                                                
17
 The Indian government states that for private power projects all risk of fuel-supply must be shared by the IPP
and the fuel supplier, the negotiation of fuel supply contracts has been a major constraint in the finalising of
PPAs.
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 :LQGSRZHUSURMHFWV3HUIRUPDQFHH[SHULHQFH
DQGGHYHORSPHQWV
This section outlines the development of the wind power industry in Gujarat since 1991.
There has been a considerable level of investment in wind power, with over 146MW existing
within Gujarat, of which 130MW is privately owned. The rate of wind capacity installation is
indicated in figure 3.
The incentives for self-generation in Gujarat were extended to include wind power, coupled
with incentives introduced by the MNES in 1993, manufacturing industries have been
encouraged to invest within wind power for their own consumption. The constraints discussed
previously may be considered as underlying factors leading to wind power development since:
Wind power production can reduce reliance on expensive and uncertain supply of fossil fuels
whilst meeting a much needed increase within generating capacity. Moreover industrial
consumers through investing in wind power for self-generation are provided with cheaper
power supply.
 7KH*XMDUDW(QHUJ\'HYHORSPHQW$JHQF\*('$
Established by the Gujarat Government in 1979, GEDA was the first Indian agency to focus
on supporting the development of renewable energy technologies. Its first director K.S. Rao
recognised the potential of utilising Gujarats wind resources to increase power supply, without
also increasing reliance on the import of fossil fuels. Rao conducted a number of studies to
assess the potential development and possible constraints to wind power in Gujarat. Through
pilot wind-farm projects the cost of wind power was estimated at Rs1.17/kWh over project
lifetime. He concluded that this would allow significant cost-savings for industrial consumers
that invested in wind power (Rao, 1991b, p.60). Rao was also very instrumental in
encouraging national policy-makers to examine India’s wind power potential (Interview,
Director of GEDA, 1997).
GEDA facilitates private sector projects through: co-ordinating potential developers with local
and international manufacturers; mobilising finance; clarifying contractual arrangements with
the GEB for wheeling and buy-back of power as well as liasing with the Gujarat government,
mainly over procurement of wasteland (GEDA, 1997b).
 3RRUZLQGSRZHUSHUIRUPDQFHV
Only a 12% average annual capacity factor18 has been achieved so far, falling short of the 19%
anticipated. Such low operating capacity factors19, which have declined over the life of the
                                                
18
 Capacity factor is a measure of the ratio of annual average power output to the rated power of the turbine. It is
important for calculating the cost of wind power from a turbine.
19
 Wind capacity factors in Europe are typically 20% at wind speeds of 6m/s rising as high as 45% at 9m/s
(European Commission, Directorate-General for Energy, 1997, Wind Energy – The Facts, Vol.1, Technology
Appendix p.69).
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project in many cases, are indication that wind power development has not been as successful
as initially expected (GEDA, 1997b). Ranging between Rs1.81/kWh up to Rs3.19/kWh, most
wind-farms generate at a cost around Rs2.55. These rates are much higher than those
estimated from the pilot projects, hence the objective for reducing the cost-effectiveness of
wind power has failed. A range of factors constraining the development of wind power have
been recognised, through experience within installation, operation and maintenance of wind
power projects many of these have been reduced.
 ,QDGHTXDWHZLQGPDSSLQJ
The initial wind mapping exercise undertaken in 1983 was inadequate. Utilising only one
anemometer for measuring the wind speeds at a single site, the whole coastal region was
declared suitable. A more thorough and extensive wind mapping program was taken up in
1985 by the Indian Institute of Tropical Meteorology at Bangalore in conjunction with GEDA
providing more accurate data of wind speeds and fluctuations at different heights and
contours. The MNES is aims to improve upon this further through deploying sophisticated
computer-aided technologies to provide a comprehensive Wind Atlas for India. (MNES,
1997).
 ,PSRUWRILQDGHTXDWHHTXLSPHQW
In the early stages of development of the wind power industry, foreign and in many cases
inferior second-hand machines were purchased, notably from California. Developed for other
systems, these turbines could not operate effectively within the Indian T&D system, which
typically undergoes large fluctuations in frequency and where outages are common-place.
Through a number of joint-venture projects, local manufacturing capabilities have been
developed. As such turbines are now designed to operate within the specific requirements of
the local system and operating problems occur less frequently. The MNES has set out to
establish national policy guidelines, standards and specifications for local turbine
manufacturers and imported components. Incentives will only be awarded to projects that
comply with these regulations. Although many wind turbine parts including the blades and
gearboxes are still imported blades, a number of components are now manufactured locally.
The MNES claims as high as 80% indigenisation of wind power components (MNES, 1997a).
 /DFNRIVNLOOVIRURSHUDWLRQDQGPDLQWHQDQFH
During the initial stages of the wind power industry the number of people with appropriate
skills and training for operating and maintaining the turbines effectively were limited.
Consequently many technical faults often went unrecognised or repairs were ineffective.
Maintenance was made much more difficult by the fact that most spare parts had to be
imported. As the skills and many components for maintaining turbines are now locally
available technical problems are more easily solved. Local manufacturers have begun to offer
full packages providing installation, operation and maintenance services, with turbines sold.
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 6LWLQJDQGSODQQLQJDSSURYDO
Proposed wind farm projects must gain approval from 12 different state government
departments. This complicated application process is very time-consuming and ultimately
incurs high costs relative to the scale of investment. In the past acquisition of non-government
land has been difficult, requiring large taxes for conversion of agricultural land for other
purposes. Recent acknowledgement that land on which wind turbines are sited can still be
used for agricultural production has led to removal of these taxes. Yet a farmer may still
object to transferral of agricultural land, which may take many years to resolve through the
legal courts. (Interview with WEPA and Wind Power Developers in Gujarat, 1997.)
 'LIILFXOWLHVLQREWDLQLQJILQDQFH
Wind power development is one of IREDAs priority areas, however potential wind developers
perceive difficulties in obtaining finance for projects. Involving numerous trips to New Delhi
for negotiation of loans, is argued to incur too much time, effort and expense relative to the
small-scale of investment (Interviews 1997). Recognising the difficulties of travelling to New
Delhi, IREDA plans to establish regional offices throughout India. Another problem relates to
the length of land leases. The Gujarat government only provides leases on land for a 15 to 30
year period. Whereas IREDA will only sanction loans for projects sited on land with a
minimum 100 year lease (IREDA, 1997b). As IREDA loans are difficult to obtain, nodal
financing agencies procure loans at the 16% interest rate, to be repaid within 10 years of the
loan agreement. However through on-lending the benefits of these “soft”-loans are not
received by wind power developers which typically are charged a higher interest rate of 18%,
to be repaid over a 6 – 8 year period. The high interest repayments incurred during the initial
investment period, increases the cost/kWh of wind power. Traditionally institutional finance is
said to have facilitated the establishment of new technologies (Ahluwahlia, 1997). However
wind projects are considered too small a scale of investment for these. Finance is procured by
local financing corporations, which on-lend to wind power developers, again at higher rates of
interest20. Therefore the mismatch between the characteristics of wind power projects and
financing criteria of IREDA is a barrier to commercialisation (Interviews, 1997).
 3RRUWUDQVPLVVLRQDQGGLVWULEXWLRQRISRZHU
Sited along the coast where local demand is very low, generated power from wind projects
must be transported over long distances by the GEB. Frequent grid outages caused through
overloading of sub-stations has meant that in order to reduce system failures, restrictions are
imposed on the times at which wind power may be evacuated. Thereby preventing wind
power projects from operating at their full potential capacity. Moreover industries requiring
more reliable power will favour an on-site generation such as a co-generator, or diesel or gas-
fired generators. (Interviews, 1997).
                                                
20
 For example the GIIC procures funds from the Indian Development Bank for Investment, which are on-lent to
wind developers at a marginal profit based on ADB guidelines.
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 7KHZLQGHQHUJ\SRZHUDVVRFLDWLRQ
The Wind Energy Power Association (WEPA) was formed in 1995 to oversee the success of
wind power in Gujarat and create a forum for collectively solving problems. There are over 35
members, membership only being made available to wind power producers of good repute,
and the intent of improving the industry’s performance. WEPA evaluates wind turbine
manufacturers, and liase with the various ministries to enable implementation of government
policy and; clarification of legal matters. Importantly WEPA provides a forum for discussion
and dissemination of information to existing and potential wind power developers; planners
and financiers. Moreover through WEPA, the wind power industry is more effectively able to
lobby the government for continuing support.
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 7KHLQFHQWLYHPHFKDQLVPV,PSDFWRQZLQG
SRZHUGHYHORSPHQW
A range of fiscal incentives for investment within wind power has been provided at the State
and National levels. Based on the success of wind power development within Gujarat and
Tamil Nadu, in 1993 the MNES formulated guidelines for encouraging private wind power
development throughout India.
Incentives suggested by the MNES
• A 5 year income tax holiday.
• 100% accelerated depreciation allowing companies to save 40% of the investment in wind
power through foregone taxes.
• Duty exemption on imported technologies.
• Wheeling of power by the SEB at a charge of 2% of the power.
• Buy-back of power by the SEB at a rate of Rs2.25/kWh.
• Third-party sale of power.
The MNES can only suggest policy and it is up to the SEBs and the state governments to
implement these.21 In Gujarat a sales tax incentive was introduced, allowing a tax reduction
on sales, worth 50% of the value of the investment of the wind project. These fiscal incentives
to allow reductions in tax payments have been the most attractive incentives for companies
with large profits. However these companies generally have little experience of the power
generation business, and virtually no knowledge of wind power projects. It is also said that
when profitable sales figures become known, industries will rush to set up a project before the
end of the financial year. Consequently not allowing time for careful planning of projects
(Interview, 1997). As the viability of wind power investments are so closely linked to
company profits most projects are of very small capacity, often consisting of only one or two
turbines. The dispersed siting of such a large number of small-scale projects makes it more
difficult for operating and maintenance services to be provided.
The fiscal incentives allow up to 90% of project costs to be recouped within the first year.
Furthermore the majority of benefits are received at the time of investment without any
requirement to generate at all. Reported cases indicate that wind turbines have been installed
without being connected to the distribution system. In one instance a fraudulent “wind
developer” received tax reductions without bothering to install a single wind turbine (WEPA,
interview, 1997).
The GEB will wheel the power to a designated factory at a charge of 2% of the power and will
bank power for a period of up to 6 months. This allows industrial consumers to avoid the cost
of purchasing more expensive utility power and the high electricity duty that must be paid in
Gujarat.
As third-party sale is not allowed investors interested in generating power primarily for selling
are deterred. Rather power must be sold to the GEB, which given its poor financial and
                                                
21
 Power projects over a certain value must be approved by the CEA.
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operational records is not an attractive option. Particularly as it is only obliged to purchase
power at a rate of Rs1.75/kWh which is lower than that suggested by the MNES. Compared to
the purchase cost of conventional private power, which the GEB is obliged to purchase at an
upward rate of Rs4/kWh, this is very low. However the GEB does not benefit from this as
there is rarely any excess power, given the typically small-scale of wind projects whereas
developers are mainly manufacturing industries with large power demands. The cost of GEB
generation from coal is around 80-90paise/kWh making it much cheaper to generate power
from coal than purchasing wind power or any alternative power (see figure 1).
However a study comparing the cost of wind power generation with coal generation22 shows
the cost of generation from coal to be much higher than the Rs1.75/kWh buy-back rate. At
12% discount rates and with a 10% inflation rate built in the levellised cost of coal generated
power is Rs1.1/kWh project costs, with running costs of Rs2.25/kWh making the total
Rs3.33/kWh. For wind powers these are respectively Rs3.23/kWh: Rs1.28/kWh and
Rs4.52/kWh. The high initial fixed costs of wind power mean that interest rates are a
significant component of the overall cost of wind power.
Contracts for the wheeling and buy-back of power are only awarded for a 3 year period. After
which there will be considerable uncertainty as to how the power may be transported or
whether any excess will be purchased. As the payback period on wind power investment has
been estimated at 14 years (TERI, 1997) such short guarantee of contracts adds risk so raising
the cost/kWh of wind power.
 6WDWXVRIWKHZLQGSRZHULQGXVWU\LQ
In 1997 interest within wind power investments dropped considerably. The Indian government
proposed to impose a minimum tax on all company assets in August 1996.  Subsequent to this
announcement there was a sharp decline in orders for wind turbines, indicating that
investment in wind power was encouraged primarily by the tax rebate incentive. Concern that
operating performances of wind projects were so poor and, realisation that certain developers
were abusing the incentives, led the Gujarat government to withdraw fiscal incentives for
future wind power projects in 1997. Overall confidence within the wind power industry has
declined, leading potential developers and policy-makers to view the potential
commercialisation of wind power with a high level of scepticism (Interview, 1997). The
confluence of declining levels of confidence within the technologies; withdrawal of incentives
at the state level and; potential changes in taxation laws at the national level served to halt
investment within wind power in Gujarat. This is indicated in figure 3.
 /RQJWHUPSRWHQWLDOIRUZLQGSRZHULQ*XMDUDW
As the overall cost of conventional power rises due to the growing proportion of more
expensive private power, and the anticipated removal of subsidies on fossil-fuels makes
conventional power more expensive, wind power will become a more competitive option.
                                                
22
 TERI (1997) p.60.
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Moreover it is widely believed that the environmental regulation of coal combustion will be
made more stringent in the future, increasing the cost of generation from coal. As the cost of
transporting goods by land23 is becoming more difficult and costly, industries are recognising
the benefits of being sited near to the ports. Furthermore plans to import larger quantities of
liquefied natural gas (LNG) from the Middle East, would further encourage industries to
develop there. Subsequently centres of growth are likely to emerge in these coastal areas
where wind resources are good, therefore reducing the need for transporting the power over
long distances. Therefore providing the capabilities for planning; manufacturing; operating
and maintaining wind turbines are maintained, wind power is likely to become commercially
competitive with conventional energy once the institutional barriers are removed.
                                                
23
 Further to the undercapacity of the Indian railways, traffic congestion, sabotage and increasing frequency of
truck driver strikes makes transport by trucks problematic.
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 &RQFOXVLRQVDQGSROLF\UHFRPPHQGDWLRQV
Problems of fuel shortage, an increasing deficit in power supply, and pressure from the
industrial sector for cheaper power are underlying factors driving for the development of wind
power in Gujarat. Experience within in operation, maintenance and siting of wind power
projects has reduced many of the earlier problems encountered. Moreover through joint-
venture projects with international turbine manufacturers, local manufacturing capabilities are
more widely available. However policy-makers need to address a number of institutional
factors if the development of the Indian wind power industry is to be successful.
Institutional complexity created by the large number of government institutions and agencies
at the national and the state level, involved in setting policies and/or authorising wind power
projects is a barrier for potential developers. Moreover renewable energy policies and
promotional activities are often duplicated, or conflict to create uncertainty.
Renewable energy programmes need to be better integrated within a national energy-planning
framework. A single Ministry for Energy for overseeing policies relating to the energy sector
could enable this. The MNES should focus on co-ordinating and integrating renewable energy
policies at the state level, ensuring greater clarity and cohesion of policies, support
mechanisms and planning procedures at all levels. Similarly land leasing laws need to be
reviewed and clearer national guidelines for siting of wind power projects suggested.
The fiscal incentives have attracted investors with little or no knowledge of the wind power
industry (nor the power industry generally). Through greater emphasis being placed on capital
investment within wind power projects and much less on operational efficiency, the incentives
have inadvertently encouraged poor practises to develop. Moreover potential investors
interested in wind power generation as their primary businesses are deterred by the terms of
grid access.
Regulation should allow fair access to the grid, and third-party sale of power. Whereby wind
power producers may negotiate directly with consumers for sale of generation. Paying a
wheeling charge to the local distributor for transportation of the power.
However the declining performance of the T&D system will continue to constrain the
development of the wind power industry. A high level of investment is urgently required for
upgrading the T&D system. It is unlikely that this will be made available until the wider issue
of structural and regulatory reform of the GEB is addressed, so encompassing the removal of
any subsidies. Unbundling of the GEB, and sale of generation assets to the private sector
would provide the GEB with the revenue for these improvements. Under a “Single Buyer"
structure the GEB could continue to wheel power at a charge determined by an independent
regulator. This would provide revenue for the GEB, and in the longer-term create potential for
competition in generation.
A more competitive wind power industry should be fostered. This paper suggests that a
mechanism similar to the Non-Fossil Fuel Obligation (NFFO) in England and Wales whereby
contracts guaranteeing a premium payment/kWh for a minimum period of 10 years should be
awarded through a competitive bidding process. This would ensure projects were more
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carefully planned and designed and encourage developers to operate wind power projects at
their full potential so reducing the cost/kWh of wind power in Gujarat. Moreover projects
would more closely match the financing criteria of IREDA, enabling lower interest loans to be
more easily obtained. NFFO contracts guarantee a premium payment per kWh for a 15-year
period, which may be taken within 5 years of contracts being awarded. Contracts are highly
sought after, and bid for competitively on the basis of the cost/kWh. Since the first NFFO
round in 1991 the price declined from 11pence/kWh to around 4.5pence/kWh in 1994
(Mitchell, 1998).
WEPA should be encouraged to continue in its activities for co-ordinating and disseminating
information between relevant stakeholders. GEDA should aim to encourage greater mobility
of local finance through employing some of the more innovative financing mechanisms.
Currently being advocated by international financing experts, these may take the form of
bundling of projects or project leasing arrangements allowing risk to be more widely shared
between shareholders.
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